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I.

INTRODUCTION

The original Constitution provided a basic vessel, but the Framers
knew that the contents of that vessel would “depend on the attitude and
decisions of Congress” in subsequent years.1 The structure of the federal
*
J.D., University of Dayton School of Law. I would like to extend my gratitude to Jeffery Schmitt
and James Steiner-Dillon for reading the early drafts of this paper and for their unending guidance and
mentorship. Thanks are also due to Julian Davis Mortenson, Jonathan Gienapp, John Dearborn,
Calvin TerBeek, Noah Rosenblum, Nick Bednar, Tommy Bennett, Blake Emerson, and Richard Primus
for their thoughtful correspondence and recommendations throughout this project. Special thanks to
Michael McConnell of Stanford Law School for generously sharing an early manuscript of his new book.
All remaining errata are the author’s.
1
LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 17 (2d ed. 1956).
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government and the departments housed within it, then, would be left to the
political process.2 With its decision in Seila Law v. Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, the Supreme Court eschewed that notion.3 At issue in the
case was the constitutionality of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s
(“CFPB”) structure, specifically, the statutory structure of the Agency’s
single director.4 The statute provided for a single director, who was, among
other things, responsible for enforcing nineteen federal statutes, “covering
everything from home finance to student loans to credit cards to banking
practices.”5 The majority believed such power was too much power.6
Writing for a five to four majority, Chief Justice Roberts struck down the
statutory structure as violative of the separation of powers.7 In so doing, the
majority provided a strong endorsement of the “unitary executive theory,”
which holds “the “executive Power’—all of it—is ‘vested in a President’”
who must faithfully execute the laws.8 In dissent, Justice Kagan criticized the
majority opinion for its formalistic reading of the Constitution’s structure.9
Justice Kagan instead applied a functionalist approach to the question in Seila
Law, recognizing that historically, the “Court has left most decisions about
how to structure the Executive Branch to Congress and the President . . . . ”10
Seila Law is merely a microcosm of a much broader debate concerning
the constitutional validity of administrative agencies and the person(s) at the
head of them. Further, Seila Law comes as part of a larger movement to
revolutionize constitutional and administrative law.11
2

E. Garrett West, Congressional Power over Office Creation, 128 YALE L.J. 166, 169 (2018).
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211 (2020).
4
Id. at 2191.
5
PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
6
Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2192.
7
See id.
8
Id. at 2191. The Unitary Executive has been endorsed time and again by high-level government
officials, most recently in the Trump Administration. See generally William P. Barr, The Role of
the Executive, 43 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 605 (2020).
9
Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2226.
10
Id. at 2224.
11
The Unitary Executive theory has been embraced by every president, at least since Ronald Reagan.
See generally Steven M. Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy: Reagan’s Lawyers and the Dynamics of
Political Investment, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 61, 79 (2009). For discussion on the conservative legal
movement, see generally STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT:
THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008). The Roberts Court has been especially accommodating
to the theory. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (holding
that “dual” for-cause removal limitations violated the separation of powers). The nondelegation doctrine
is yet another aspect of the impending revolution. Justice Gorsuch has joined Justice Thomas in expressing
skepticism of the constitutionality of congressional delegations of legislative power to administrative
agencies. See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2139 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing
that delegations of legislative power have no basis in the original public meaning of the Constitution);
Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 66–91 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that, under the original public meaning of the Constitution, it is unconstitutional for
Congress to delegate “the discretion to formulate generally applicable rules of private conduct.”). It is
important to note, however, that there is significant evidence that the originalist position on the
nondelegation doctrine is historically dubious. See, e.g., Nicholas R. Parrillo, A Critical Assessment of the
Originalist Case Against Administrative Regulatory Power: New Evidence from the Federal Tax
on Private Real Estate in the 1790s, 130 YALE L .J. 1288 (2021) (arguing that originalist advocates of the
3
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The first sentence of Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution grant or
“vest” the respective branch with a general power.12 These “Vesting
Clauses,” then, serve as initial grants of authority—legislative, executive, or
judicial—to each branch of the federal government that are thus written at
a certain level of vagueness and generality.13 The language of the Article II
Vesting Clause has been especially labyrinthine to scholars and judges alike.14
Importantly, the text of the Constitution is silent with regard to how the
Vesting Clauses interact with the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I.15
Recent scholarship has shown that, as a matter of original
understanding, the Article II Vesting Clause was a thin grant that merely
contained the power to carry laws into execution.16 Others agree that the
Vesting Clause was indeed the power to execute the laws set forth by
Congress, but such scholars argue that the power to execute the laws was
necessarily robust and included an implicit authority to control executive
officers.17 Still, others argue that both the Article II Vesting Clause and Take
Care Clause operate as distinct grants of authority.18
Focusing on the Article II Vesting Clause, and given that it was
understood as a relatively thin grant of power, this Comment argues that the
Necessary and Proper Clause should be understood as a kind of “catch-all”
provision that leaves Congress with broad authority to structure the federal
nondelegation doctrine are wrong to argue that no early congressional grants of rulemaking power were
coercive and domestic); Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121
COLUM. L. REV. 277 (2021) (refuting the claim that the original Constitution contained a nondelegation
doctrine). It remains to be seen how far the Court is willing to go, but challenges to administrative agencies
on nondelegation grounds are bound to continue. See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, No. 20-1530, 2021 U.S.
LEXIS 5337 (Oct 29, 2021); Jarkesy v. SEC, No. 20-61007, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 13460 (5th Cir.
May 18, 2022) (holding that delegating discretion to the SEC to decide whether to adjudicate fraud claims
in Article III courts or in front of Administrative Law Judges violates the nondelegation doctrine).
12
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
13
See e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.”); id. art. III, § 1, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”).
14
See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern
conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to
interpret for Pharaoh.”).
15
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
16
Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1173 (2019); Julian Davis Mortenson, What Two Crucial Words in the Constitution
Actually Mean, ATLANTIC (June 2, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/executivepower-doesnt-mean-much/590461/.
17
See, e.g., Ilan Wurman, In Search of Prerogative, 70 DUKE L.J. 93 (2020).
18
MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, THE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD NOT BE KING: EXECUTIVE POWER
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 165, 167 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2020). Professor McConnell sets forth
a framework with which to analyze separation of powers disputes. See generally id. In McConnell’s view,
the Framers vested the President with certain prerogative powers, such as the commander-in-chief power,
that may not be limited by Congress. Id. Other powers—those implicit in the Vesting Clause—are residual
and may be limited by Congress pursuant to its own enumerated powers. Id.
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government, specifically the Executive Branch, through legislation.19
That authority includes broad power to control removal power.20 This
authority is not limitless.21 In Seila Law, the Supreme Court relied on the
unitarian reading of the Article II Vesting Clause to strike down the structure
of the CFPB.22 In so doing, the Court determined that shielding the single
director of the CFPB from at-will removal violated the separation of powers.23
The majority opinion in Seila Law provided a ringing endorsement of
the Unitary Executive Theory and sounded a warning toll for administrative
agencies headed by single directors. Indeed, the Court’s holding in Seila Law
will likely spawn extensive litigation concerning the constitutionality of other
important agencies whose discretion encompasses issues ranging from
housing to review of patents.24 Scholars have frequently noted that the
Constitution is bereft of a presidential “removal clause.”25 Indeed, the text
merely provides a method for appointing federal officers subject to senatorial
advice and consent.26 But, the only explicit method for removal of officers is
through impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction by the
Senate.27 Given that textual silence, this Comment contends that the
Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress plenary power to place limits
on the President’s removal power regarding “inferior” executive branch
officers.
The position of Unitary Executive theorists—that the President
wields illimitable removal power by virtue of “the executive Power,” exempt
from Congressional limitation—is therefore best understood as an exception

19
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress the authority to legislate in pursuance of the
“enumerated” powers, the Necessary and Proper Clause also grants Congress the power for “carrying into
Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof.”).
20
See generally Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (Kagan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21
See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding that the President is vested with
general removal power by virtue of the Vesting Clause); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (holding that “dual” for-cause removal limitations violated the
separation of powers).
22
See Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
23
See id.
24
The Court decided Collins v. Yellen in 2021, which calls into question the constitutionality of the
Federal Housing Financing Agency (“FHFA”); the structure of the FHFA is nearly identical to that which
the Court struck down in Seila Law. See generally 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021). Additionally, the Court recently
decided United States v. Arthrex, which concerns the constitutionality of statutory provisions that vest the
Secretary of Commerce with power to appoint administrative patent judges, removable only for cause.
See generally 141 S. Ct. 1970 (2021). For a critique of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Arthrex, see Patrick
J. Sobkowski, A Matter of “Principal”: A Critique of the Federal Circuit’s Decision in Arthrex v. Smith
& Nephew, Inc., 98 WASH. U.L. REV. ONLINE 30 (2021).
25
See Edward S. Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power Under the Constitution,
27 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 358 (1927); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS,
1787–1957, at 85 (1957); Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2013).
26
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
27
Id. art. II, § 4.
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to the Constitutional rule.28 Thus, in characterizing the removal limitations
upheld by the Supreme Court in Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison v. Olson
as exceptions to the President’s otherwise illimitable removal power, the
majority opinion in Seila Law gets it exactly backwards.29 This Comment is
both critical and prospective in nature. It is critical in the sense that the
Supreme Court’s removal jurisprudence is profoundly mistaken and
prospective in that it discusses the implications of that jurisprudence for other
administrative agencies going forward. The Court’s decision also presents an
opportunity to discuss the nature of the relationship between Congress and
the Executive Branch.
This Comment is divided into three parts and shall proceed as
follows. Part II will provide a brief historical and doctrinal background
regarding the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Article II Vesting Clause.
Given the capacious literature regarding both Clauses, Part II will synthesize
various primary sources, as well as marshal the relevant literature into
a coherent whole. Part III will discuss the relevant case law regarding
removal power, with special emphasis on Seila Law. The Supreme Court has
never definitively embraced the Unitary Executive Theory despite vigorous
advocacy to the contrary.30 Instead, the Court has policed a kind of middle
ground, wherein it “plays the field” between strictly formalistic and
functionalist approaches to removal power.31 In Part IV, this Comment will
discuss the implications posed by Seila Law with regard to future questions
regarding removal power and limitations thereon. Scholars recognize that the
Court’s decision will invite further litigation concerning the constitutionality
of removal limitations on other agencies.32 While the Court appears to be
positioning itself to embrace a stronger form of the Unitary Executive,
it should refrain from using the theory to gut agencies headed by “inferior”
officers.
A full embrace of the Unitary Executive would cripple
administrative agencies and overrun an already-inhibited Congress.
28
For some helpful expositions of the Unitary Executive Theory, see Steven G. Calabresi &
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); John Yoo,
Unitary, Executive, or Both?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1935 (2009). See generally CHARLES C. THACH, JR.,
THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775–1789 (1923); WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE PRESIDENCY: ITS
DUTIES, ITS POWERS, ITS OPPORTUNITIES AND ITS LIMITATIONS (1916).
29
Compare Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935), and Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 657–59 (1988), with Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183,
2192 (2020).
30
See, e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia’s “lone dissent” in
Morrison has become the standard by which unitarian scholarship is measured. See generally Jay S. Bybee,
Printz, the Unitary Executive, and the Fire in the Trash Can: Has Justice Scalia Picked the Court's
Pocket?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 269 (2001).
31
See generally John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1939 (2011).
32
See Ganesh Sitaraman, The Political Economy of the Removal Power, 134 HARV. L. REV. 352, 390
(2020).
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Therefore, the Constitution’s textual silence on presidential removal should
instead be understood to indicate that Congress, via the Necessary and Proper
Clause, is vested with complete power to place “for cause” limitations on the
removal of inferior officers. This Comment will thus provide a critique of the
Court’s jurisprudence regarding “principal” officers and provide
a prospective analysis regarding related questions. A conclusion on the
assertions made throughout will then follow in Part V.
II.

BACKGROUND: THE CLAUSES IN THE SUPREME COURT AND HISTORY

This section shall provide a brief discussion of both the Necessary
and Proper Clause and the Article II Vesting Clause, as each has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court and throughout history. Naturally, such
a discussion will entail the synthesis of primary and secondary sources
concerning each Clause. Part I.A will present a survey of the relevant
literature regarding the Vesting Clause. As mentioned above, scholars
maintain two general positions regarding the Article II Vesting Clause:
the Unitary Executive Theory and the “law execution” thesis.33
In Part I.B, this Comment provides a historical and doctrinal survey
of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Chief Justice Marshall’s discussion of
the Clause’s breadth in McCulloch v. Maryland has spurred centuries
of debate, beginning principally with the Court’s expansion of federal power
in the New Deal Era and culminating in the “federalism revolution” of the
Rehnquist Court in the late twentieth century.34 All of this is to say that
the Necessary and Proper Clause has traveled a tumultuous interpretive path,
with no clear exposition of the exact contours of its reach.
A. The Executive Power and Removal
Justice Joseph Story begins his lengthy discussion of the executive
branch with a declaration that defining its powers and duties “are problems
among the most important, and probably the most difficult to be satisfactorily
solved, of all which are involved in the theory of free governments.”35
The Articles of Confederation had shied away from vesting executive officers
with too much power; indeed, executive officers had virtually no power at all
under the Articles.36 States such as Virginia consciously declined to vest its
33
I borrow this term from Julian Davis Mortenson. See Mortenson, supra notes 11, 16 and
accompanying text.
34
See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
(famously striking down the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act as beyond Congress’s legislative authority
under the Commerce Clause—the first time in half a century).
35
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 515
(Little, Brown & Co., 5th ed. 1891).
36
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 250 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1996) (“The evisceration of executive power was the most
conspicuous aspect of the early state constitutions, which deprived the executive of its political
independence and nearly every power that smacked of royal prerogative.”) (emphasis added).
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governor with the power over areas such as foreign affairs.37 Hesitance on
the part of the Framers to empower a chief executive is understandable.
After all, the Framers and their ancestors had seen the potentially deleterious
results of a monarchy.38 Furthermore, America’s hard-fought independence
from Great Britain had just been won based, at least in part, on its distaste for
monarchical authority.39 The Framers feared an executive officer who
appealed directly to the people.40 Instead, they anticipated that Congress
would respond to the people’s wishes and legislate accordingly; the President
was to “check popular enthusiasms.”41 The key issue was to strike a balance
between the weakened Confederation executive framework and a traditional
monarch.42
The debate over the executive branch at the Constitutional
Convention was extensive.43 The delegates were deeply conflicted as to what
powers should be vested in the new President.44 Indeed, the debate concerned
such seemingly-minuscule details, such as the title of the executive officer.45
While such a debate may seem frivolous by contemporary standards, the
delegates were not convinced that future incumbents would be able to resist
the temptation of nobility.46 Pennsylvania Senator William Maclay was
the principal advocate against titles of nobility, stressing that they “have lately
had a hard struggle for our liberty against kingly authority and everything
related to that species of government is odious to the people.”47
Senator Maclay’s cautionary soliloquy is indicative of similar sentiments
among certain delegates.

37
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 136–37 (1969).
For example, Thomas Jefferson agreed with William Hooper of North Carolina that a magistrate would be
necessary for execution, but only for execution. See id. Indeed, Jefferson’s 1776 draft of the Virginia
Constitution contemplated a governor “without a voice in legislation, without any control over the meeting
of the Assembly, without the authority to declare war or make peace,” and without any of the powers
traditionally associated with royal prerogatives. Id.
38
RAKOVE, supra note 36, at 245. The early American perspective on executive power was
inextricably linked to historical instances: the disputes of Stuart England; ministerial corruption under the
Hanoverian kings; and lessons learned from state constitutions’ attempts to cabin executive power. Id.
39
See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 131 (2005) (“The young
continent needed a president who would be far more than a legislative presiding officer, a state governor,
or a prime minister, but far less than a king.”). But see generally, ERIC NELSON, THE ROYALIST
REVOLUTION: MONARCHY AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING (2014) (arguing that the Framers actually
endorsed broad, king-like grants of executive authority).
40
See Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental
Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070, 2072 (2009).
41
Id. (emphasis added).
42
See generally MCCONNELL, supra note 18.
43
See generally DAVID BRIAN ROBERTSON, THE ORIGINAL COMPROMISE (2013).
44
See generally MCCONNELL, supra note 18.
45
AMAR, supra note 39, at 135.
46
Id. (“[M]any who had risked their lives against King George III strove to preserve the New World
order from even the slightest hint of creeping monarchy and aristocracy.”).
47
Id.
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Edmund Randolph, the firebrand Virginia governor, echoed the
concerns that surrounded a single, united executive.48 Randolph “strenuously
opposed a unity in the Executive magistracy” and worried that the imposition
of a too-powerful executive would be the “fœtus of monarchy.”49 Not unlike
Randolph, delegates like Roger Sherman advocated for a single but limited
executive officer.50 He saw the executive as “nothing more than an institution
for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect, that the person or persons
ought to be appointed by and accountable to the Legislature only . . . .”51 This
position is ostensibly similar to the theory advanced by some aforementioned
scholars.52 Gouverneur Morris harbored a familiar fear; he worried that the
legislative branch would usurp power.53 He also vigorously argued for
a number of executive officers to aid the President in his constitutional
duties.54 In short, a united yet limited executive was thought to be an essential
feature of the separation of powers.55
The Framers debated the nature of the powers to be granted to the
executive at length.56 As mentioned above, the nature of “the executive
Power” is hotly contested among scholars, but the Framers also were careful
to explicitly enumerate a handful of concrete powers for exercise by the
President.57 The Constitution weakened the President’s powers by granting
some of those to Congress.58 The Constitution thus created a government
whose branches would share certain powers.59

48
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 66 (Max Farrand ed.,
Yale U. Press 1911).
49
Id.
50
Id. at 65.
51
Id.
52
See, e.g., Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, supra
note 16, at 1186.
53
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 48, at 52 (“It is necessary to
take into one view all that relates to the establishment of the Executive; on the due formation of which
must depend the efficacy and utility of the Union among the present and future States. It has been a maxim
in political Science that Republican Government is not adapted to a large extent of Country because the
energy of the Executive Magistracy can not reach the extreme parts of it. Our Country is an extensive one.
We must either then renounce the blessings of the Union, or provide an Executive with sufficient vigor
to pervade every part of it.”).
54
Id. at 53–54 (These executive officers included “certain great officers of State; a minister of finance,
of war, of foreign affairs &c. These he presumes will exercise their functions in subordination to
the Executive, and will be amendable by impeachment to the public Justice.”).
55
For a discussion of the evolution of the American Presidency, particularly the development of the
Unitary Executive Theory, see Skowronek, supra note 40.
56
See RAKOVE, supra note 36, at 245.
57
See generally MCCONNELL, supra note 18.
58
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the power to “declare War, .
. . [t]o raise and support Armies, . . . [t]o provide and maintain a Navy,” and various controls over the
militia. Id.
59
RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS OF
LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 29 (1990) (famously asserting that the Constitution did not
create a government of separated powers, but “a government of separated institutions sharing powers”).
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The Framers saw fit to give the President help to perform his
constitutional duties.60 As such, it expressly vested the President with the
power to appoint executive branch officers.61 This marked a departure from
early fears that appointment in the hands of the chief magistrate would lead
to corruption.62 But, the same provision gives Congress permission to vest
appointment of “inferior” officers elsewhere.63 However, the Appointments
Clause differed from the treaty power in one key aspect: only a simple
majority of the Senate was necessary to confirm an appointment.64 Treaties
would necessarily have vast implications for international affairs; whereas
appointments would “have no direct impact on domestic or international
law . . . .”65 In fact, the Framers initially believed that the appointment power
should be unconditionally vested in the President; the initial draft of the
Constitution did not require senatorial advice and consent.66 This would
change quickly, however, when the provision was amended by committee to
read as it does today.67
The Appointments Clause inevitably begged the question of removal
power. The question was largely left unresolved at the Constitutional
Convention, and as a result, the Constitution’s only express provision for
removal is by way of impeachment.68 Indeed, aside from the removal via the
Impeachment Clause, “[t]he subject was not discussed in the Constitutional
Convention.”69
As mentioned, the removal power was not discussed at length at the
Constitutional Convention; instead, it was debated at length in what has been
deemed “The Decision of 1789.”70 The Decision (or indecision) took place
during the First Congress and centered around the establishment of several
60
See generally LINDSAY M. CHERVINSKY, THE CABINET: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE
CREATION OF AN AMERICAN INSTITUTION (2020). Curiously, the Constitution is silent with regard to
a board of advisors or “cabinet” for the President to consult. Id.
61
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. (“[A]nd he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.”).
62
See WOOD, supra note 37, at 144. William Blackstone discussed the power conferred on the
English monarchs by appointment power. Id. The ability of the King to enlist the help of officers
“extended the influence of government to every corner of the nation.” Id.
63
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
64
Id.
65
AMAR, supra note 39, at 192.
66
See STORY, supra note 35, at 351.
67
See id. at 351–52.
68
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States,
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors.”).
69
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 109–10 (1926).
70
See CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 302 (1966).
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executive departments—specifically, a department of foreign affairs—and
who should have the power to control the officials in those departments.71
The debate on removal was necessary; after all, the various state
constitutions that preceded the new Constitution were inconclusive on the
issue.72 The relative confusion was further compounded by Alexander
Hamilton’s concession in The Federalist that “advice and consent” were
necessary for both appointment and removal of executive branch officers.73
Aside from Hamilton’s passing mention, the removal power was absent from
constitutional debate until the First Congress.74
The Representatives at the First Congress debated the removal power
at length.75 But that debate arguably did not resolve itself.76 The issue arose
out of necessity; if the President were to manage the government effectively,
he would need helping hands that were at least somewhat answerable to him.77
New Jersey Representative Elias Boudinot advocated that the First Congress
“carry the intention of the Constitution into effect” by creating various
executive departments.78
As the debate in Congress unfolded, there emerged four principal
theories of removal authority.79 Each theory had a handful of supporters, but
the “impeachment theory” was the first to be disposed of, presumably because
of the cumbersome nature in practice.80 The dismissal of the “impeachment
theory” makes sense; impeachment was—and still is—a drastic measure, and
the practical difficulties resulted in very few adherents.81 Limiting removal
power exclusively to impeachment would have left the President at the mercy
of Congress, which would have inevitably resulted in inefficiency
in government.82

71

See J. DAVID ALVIS ET AL., THE CONTESTED REMOVAL POWER, 1789–2010, at 18 (2013).
Id. at 17.
73
THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The consent
of [the Senate] would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint.”).
74
See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801,
at 36 (1997).
75
See generally id.
76
See, e.g., Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Indecisions of 1789: Inconstant Originalism,
(May 1, 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3596566.
77
See Saikrishna Prakash, New Light of the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1029 (2006).
78
ALVIS ET AL., supra note 71, at 17.
79
Id. at 18. The first, the “impeachment theory” held that impeachment was the only textually
enumerated mode of removal. Id. The “advice-and-consent theory” vested the removal power in the
President and Congress jointly, and no other mode was permissible. Id. The “congressional delegation
theory” held that, since the text was silent, Congress could vest removal power in the President alone, or
reserve some latitude for itself. Id. Finally, adherents to the “executive power theory” said that the grant
of “executive Power” in Article II vested the President alone with removal power. Id.
80
Id. at 18–19.
81
See Prakash, supra note 77, at 1035. The impeachment theory had the support of “no more than
two or three Representatives.” Id. (footnote omitted).
82
See generally 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 48 (showing
that generally there were inefficiency concerns as to removal power being tied to impeachment).
72
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The “executive power” theory found support in none other than James
Madison, albeit after switching sides, who argued that the “[C]onstitution
affirms that the executive power shall be vested in the [P]resident.”83
The “executive power” theory was especially palatable to those
Representatives who supported a broad interpretation of the Article II Vesting
Clause.84 Fisher Ames of Massachusetts also prominently joined the
proponents of the “executive power” theory, arguing to “put all executive
power in the hands of the President, and could he personally execute all the
laws, there would be no occasion for establishing auxiliaries; but the
circumscribed powers of one man, demand the aid of others.”85 Additionally,
George Clymer of Pennsylvania bluntly asserted that “the power of removal
was an executive power” and therefore rested with the President by virtue of
“the express words” of the Vesting Clause.86 Eventually, even Hamilton
joined Madison and Clymer as among those advocating for broad presidential
authority to remove officers.87 The evidence is supportive of assertions that
prominent Representatives believed in broad removal authority for the
President.88 As such, this theory of removal power conveniently maps onto
the modern rendition of the Unitary Executive Theory embraced by a number
of scholars.89
Despite the demonstrated agreement between prominent
representatives, legal historians have shown that the “Decision of 1789”
perhaps was not a decision at all.90 Indeed, there is much historical evidence
that demonstrates a lack of consensus in the First Congress regarding the
removal question.91 The Treasury Act enacted by the First Congress
contained an anti-corruption clause, which enabled the judiciary to remove
Treasury officers who had been convicted of “high misdemeanors.” 92
In essence, the “high misdemeanors” language was legally equivalent to the

83

See Prakash, supra note 77, at 1040.
See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 28, at 644.
Id.
86
CURRIE, supra note 74, at 38.
87
See JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE
FOUNDING ERA 155 (2018).
88
See SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 195 (2015).
89
For some helpful, prominent conservative interpretations of the Article II Vesting Clause, see
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–99, 704–06, 710–13, 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See generally
Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2006); MICHAEL
D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2007).
90
See generally Shugerman, supra note 76
91
See id. at 3.
92
Id. at 8.
84
85
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“modern “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” language
used in statutes such as the one at issue in Seila Law.93
In other words, the First Congress, typically used by Unitary theorists
to show that the original understanding of the Article II Vesting Clause
contained the removal power, did not quite settle on indefeasible presidential
removal power.94 Rather, the vesting of removal authority in the judiciary by
the Treasury Act shows that Congress seems to have rejected the
Unitary Theory.95 Further, the “high misdemeanors” language (and its
modern equivalent) has been shown to be a removal permission.96 This means
that the President may remove an officer, but only if that officer has acted
wrongfully, failed to perform their statutory duties, or has performed their
duties in a wasteful manner.97 In other words, the President may not simply
remove an officer because they feel like it.98 Rather, the permissiveness of
the removal language is contingent upon some sort of inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office.99 The debate over removal was important for
yet another reason: it pointed out the indeterminacy of the Constitution as
a governing document and demonstrated that subsequent practice would be
determinative in constructing its true meaning.100
Though the initial debate over the removal power began in 1789,
it has continued to manifest itself amongst scholars and the Supreme Court
itself.101 However, the Supreme Court does not currently embrace anything
akin to the “executive power” theory of removal, even despite some
rhetorically powerful advocacy.102 Despite this advocacy, even supporters of
the Unitary Executive have acknowledged that the debate over removal is an
ongoing enterprise.103 Instead, the debate over removal power has settled on
93
Jane Manners & Lev Menand, The Three Permissions: Presidential Removal and the Statutory
Limits of Agency Independence, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2021).
94
See Shugerman, supra note 76, at 8. Unitary Executive theorists point to early congresses as having
special standing in terms of discerning original public meaning. Scholars have set forth frameworks
through which constitutional meaning can be “liquidated” or “constructed” through historical practice or
debate and settlement. See generally William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1
(2019) (detailing the theory of constitutional liquidation that is commonly attributed to James Madison);
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
MEANING (1999) (arguing that constitutional interpretation requires “construction” whereby political
actors formulate constitutional meaning).
95
See generally WHITTINGTON, supra note 94.
96
See Manners & Menand, supra note 93, at 8.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
See GIENAPP, supra note 87, at 128.
101
The Supreme Court continues to hear cases such as Seila Law and Collins v. Mnuchin, which pose
constitutional challenges to the structures of various administrative agencies. See generally Seila Law v.
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020); Collins v. Mnuchin, 141 S. Ct. 207 (2020).
102
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson is still hailed as a magisterial achievement in the
unitarian canon. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–99, 704–06, 710–13, 715 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
103
See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 10 (2008).
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jurisprudence that allows latitude for Congress to place some limits on the
President’s removal power.104 The key distinction in these cases is that
Congress has merely placed limits on the President’s removal power; it has
not reassigned that removal power from the President.105
B. The Necessary and Proper Clause
The Necessary and Proper Clause has been appropriately described
as “a masterpiece of enigmatic formulation . . . .”106 Indeed, much historical
debate remains regarding the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause
and federalism more generally.107 Scholarly interpretations of the Clause’s
breadth in relation to federalism are equally as capacious.108 Moreover, some
scholars have argued that the Clause should be interpreted narrowly as only
having granted Congress the incidental powers to execute the enumerated
powers.109 Still, other scholars have claimed that the Clause is best viewed as
an “auxiliary enumerated power,” meaning that Congress may not enact
legislation simply because it is “necessary and proper” to do so.110 A recent
104
See generally Morrison, 487 U.S. 654. A primary argument against the constitutionality of the
independent counsel was that the President’s grant of “executive Power” vested him with unfettered power
to remove the independent counsel. Id.
105
See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below at 9, Seila Law v.
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (No. 19-7).
106
JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER ORIGINAL
INTENT 4 (1999). The Clause reads that Congress shall have the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
107
See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
108
Scholars have long engaged in debate on, and theories of, federalism, comparing “dual federalism,”
“cooperative federalism,” and “dynamic federalism.” For a leading exposition of “dual federalism,”
see generally Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1484 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987)). McConnell
argues that dual federalism is best suited “(1) ‘to secure the public good,’ (2) to protect ‘private rights,’
and (3) ‘to preserve the spirit and form of popular government.” Id. at 1492. Likewise, for a defense of
cooperative federalism, see generally Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663 (2001). Weiser argues that this brand of federalism
preserves spheres for both the federal and state governments. Id. Specifically, a federal framework
undoubtedly exists, but that framework leaves ample space in which state agencies may “cooperate” with
the federal government in implementing policy. Id. at 667. Notably, the Supreme Court has observed that
cooperation is desirable, but Congress may not “commandeer” or force state governments to implement
policy. See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992). Finally, some scholars advocate for “dynamic federalism” under which the federal
and state governmental authorities overlap, and nearly any matter is within the jurisdictional purview of
both. For an argument that dynamic or “polyphonic” federalism creates helpful space for both agreement
and conflict between the state and federal governments, see generally Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory
of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005). A detailed exposition of the various theories
of federalism is beyond the scope of this Comment but the important takeaway is that the scope of the
Necessary and Proper Clause is contested.
109
See, e.g., GARY LAWSON ET AL., THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 52 (2010).
110
Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution: Federalism in the Long Founding Moment,
67 STAN. L. REV. 397, 407 (2015).
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school of “revisionist” scholars has questioned the notion of enumerated
powers, the limitations placed on Congress thereby, and the implications for
constitutional structure.111
Much of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding the Necessary
and Proper Clause has developed in relation to the enumerated powers,
specifically in the context of the Commerce Clause.112 As such, it is helpful
to discuss the Court’s decisions bearing on federalism generally and the
Necessary and Proper Clause more specifically.
The nature of federal power—and the extent thereof—was a central
concern at the Constitutional Convention.113 The debates took the form of
state-versus-federal power, whose roots could be found in the core concept of
sovereignty.114 That concept provided a foundation on which the entire
legitimacy of the new government rested.115 The Articles of Confederation
had created two separate spheres of authority between the states and the
Confederation Congress.116 Indeed, James Madison recognized that those
competing interests did not necessarily “lie between the large states and small
[s]tates . . . [but] between the Northern and Southern.”117 The disparity
undeniably found its roots in the debate over slavery.118 The Anti-Federalist
opponents of the Constitution complained that those provisions that granted
federal power were ambiguous and that the “states [were] robbed of important
governmental functions.”119 Lurking in the background of these debates was
the issue of slavery and whether the new Congress could abolish the
institution in several states.120 Indeed, the success of the Constitution
depended on this issue; for example, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South
Carolina opined that he would “be bound by duty to his State” to oppose the
Constitution unless the document curtailed congressional power over

111
See generally Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576 (2014); Richard
Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2016); DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF
THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE 200-YEAR ODYSSEY OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND
(2019); Jonathan Gienapp, The Myth of the Constitutional Given: Enumeration and National Power at
the Founding, 69 AM. U.L. REV. 183 (2020).
112
See generally Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; Gonzales, 545 U.S. 1.
113
See generally AMAR, supra note 39.
114
See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 198 (1967).
115
See generally EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988). Morgan famously argued that the idea of sovereignty
was weaponized by the political elites in order to successfully establish the new federal government. Id.
116
RAKOVE, supra note 36, at 167.
117
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 48, at 486.
118
See Jeffrey Schmitt, Slavery and the History of Congress's Enumerated Powers, 74 ARK. L. REV.
641 (2021).
119
SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM & THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN
AMERICA, 1788–1828, at 30 (1999).
120
See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION (2016).
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slavery.121 In short, curtailment of federal legislative power was a prerequisite
to the success of the Constitutional Convention of 1787.122
Concerns about the nature of federal power were compounded
with the advent of the Necessary and Proper Clause.123 During Ratification,
Anti-Federalist critics, such as George Mason, worried that Congress would
use the Clause as a cudgel to inflict severe punishments upon dissenters and
“threaten the powers retained by the states and rights retained by the
people.”124 John Rutledge of South Carolina had vehemently opposed the
vagueness of the residual grant of authority proposed by the Virginia Plan.125
During the Constitutional Convention, delegates such as George Mason,
Elbridge Gerry, and Edmund Randolph maintained reservations about key
provisions of the Constitution’s text.126 Some of those reservations manifest
themselves in the relationship between the Senate and President on matters
such as the appointment of executive branch officers, treaties, and
impeachment.127 Chief among those concerns, however, was the potential for
legislative aggrandizement, specifically through the ambiguity of “necessary
and proper.”128 As noted by James Madison, the concern was not exclusive
to those in opposition to the Constitution.129
Opposite Rutledge was James Wilson, a lawyer from Pennsylvania
and “perhaps America’s most incisive legal thinker.”130 Unlike Rutledge,
Gerry, and Randolph, Wilson was forceful in his advocacy for
broad legislative authority.131 When Wilson introduced the initial draft of
what would become the Necessary and Proper Clause to the Committee
of Detail, it vested the “Supreme legislative power” in Congress.132 Notably,
that initial draft omitted the now-famous “enumerated powers,” only to be
included after rejecting the aforementioned “supreme legislative power”
language.133 Additionally, Resolution VI of the Virginia Plan vested
Congress with the power to “legislate in all cases to which the separate
121

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 48, at 95.
See generally Schmitt, supra note 118.
123
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
124
PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788,
at 46 (2010).
125
See John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1060–61 (2014).
126
STATES’ RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 43, 50, 73
(Frederick D. Drake & Lynn R. Nelson eds., 1999).
127
Id. at 73–74.
128
MAIER, supra note 124, at 51.
129
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 306 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining that
“[t]he legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into
its impetuous vortex.”).
130
GIENAPP, supra note 87, at 67.
131
See generally id.
132
Id. at 67.
133
Id.
122
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States are incompetent.”134 Again, Rutledge and Pinckney “objected to the
vagueness of the term incompetent.”135 It is thus fair to say that any language
hinting at unlimited legislative reach was toxic to the possibility of
the Constitution’s ratification.136
Despite the early debate over the language, the final formulation of
the Clause was accepted without much contention, passing unanimously
at the Convention.137 Some of the delegates accepted that the Clause would
grant residual powers to Congress but did not openly advocate that notion for
fear that it would scare the Anti-Federalists.138 Thus, in terms of the language
of the Clause, Rutledge won his battle with Wilson.139 Rutledge opposed the
“incompetence” language and instead argued for an enumeration of powers
that would limit the powers of Congress to the execution of the “foregoing
powers.”140 The key takeaway from the history of the Necessary and Proper
Clause is that, while the language of the Clause found its way into the
Constitution’s text without much debate, the precise meaning and scope of
the powers conferred by that language have been subject to much subsequent
debate.141
1.

The Necessary and Proper Clause in the Supreme Court

Conventional wisdom holds that the Constitution created
a government of limited and enumerated powers.142 That proposition has
become the constitutional orthodoxy as embraced by the Supreme Court.143
As mentioned above, the precise interaction of the enumerated powers and
the Necessary and Proper Clause has vexed the Court and scholars.144
Rather than undertake to precisely and concisely define “necessary and
proper,” the Court has demarcated limits in what can fairly be described as a
case-by-case basis.145 As recently as 2012, in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius (“NFIB”), the Court struck down the
individual mandate and held that a given regulation could be “necessary” but
not “proper” under the Constitution.146 Instead of defining the exact contours
of the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Court drew a line between activity
RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN 65 (1987) (footnote omitted).
Id. (footnote omitted).
136
See generally Schmitt, supra note 118.
137
RAKOVE, supra note 36, at 180.
138
See LYNCH, supra note 106, at 21.
139
See generally id.
140
See Mikhail, supra note 125, at 1061.
141
See, e.g., JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969)
(compiling the anonymous letters written by Marshall in defense of the decision).
142
See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 297 (2d ed. 1988); GREGORY E.
MAGGS & PETER J. SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 113 (2d ed. 2011).
143
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
144
See generally LYNCH, supra note 106.
145
See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
146
See id. at 560.
134
135
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and inactivity.147 The Court declared that the Framers vested Congress with
the power to “regulate commerce, not to compel it” and declined to augment
congressional power otherwise.148 The Court’s decision in NFIB thus
attached a caveat to the Rehnquist Court’s blessing of Congress’s power to
regulate economic activity: Congress may regulate economic activity, but
it may not create such activity.149
Debates concerning congressional power under the Commerce
Clause were not novel, and for roughly the first third of the twentieth century,
the Court interpreted the Clause quite narrowly.150 Under Chief Justice Taft’s
leadership in the early twentieth century, the Court aggressively struck down
economic and social legislation.151 The Taft Court’s narrow conception of the
Commerce Clause stemmed from the Court’s nineteenth-century conception
when the Court significantly narrowed the scope of federal congressional
power in favor of robust states’ rights in the wake of Reconstruction.152
The Court continued this trend into the mid-1930s, repeatedly striking down
President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation as beyond congressional
regulation.153
147

Id. at 555.
Id.
149
Id.
150
See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down the Guffey Coal Act, which
regulated coal prices, minimum wages, and maximum hours, as beyond Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause). For a recent revisionist account of the Taft Court, see KEVIN J. BURNS, WILLIAM
HOWARD TAFT’S CONSTITUTIONAL PROGRESSIVISM (2021).
151
David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 1931–1940, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 504, 504 (1987).
152
See generally ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION
REMADE THE CONSTITUTION (2019). Foner is a part of the academy that argues the Reconstruction
Amendments completely reoriented the structure of the Constitution. For Foner and other scholars,
the narrow interpretation of the 14th Amendment was incorrect. See generally ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI,
THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND
CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866–1876 (1985). However, the Court’s narrowing of congressional power following
Reconstruction has not gone without controversy. For example, Kurt Lash argues that the Framers of the
14th Amendment only intended to incorporate enumerated rights—those in the Bill of Rights—against
the states; for Lash and other scholars, then, the Court’s action in cases such as Slaughter-House were
consistent with the original meaning of the 14th Amendment. See generally KURT T. LASH, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2014).
Still, other scholars argue that the 14th Amendment, particularly the Privileges or Immunities Clause, was
not intended to incorporate any rights against the states. Instead, the Framers meant the provisions
in Section 1 of the Amendment as equality provisions. In other words, states could enact nearly any law,
but they had to apply that law equally to all citizens. See generally ILAN WURMAN: THE SECOND
FOUNDING: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 10 (2020); John Harrison,
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992). Conversely, scholars
such as Michael Kent Curtis have argued that the Bill of Rights was incorporated against the states by way
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment. See generally MICHAEL KENT CURTIS,
NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68–92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
153
See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down labor regulations in the
coal industry); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down labor
regulations in the poultry industry).
148
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The Court famously reversed doctrinal course in 1937 in the face
of President Roosevelt’s threat to “pack” the Court.154 Some scholars argue
that the practical effect of the famous “switch in time” was minimal and that
the Court had actually begun laying the foundations for its shift prior to
1937.155 Alternatively, some scholars argue that the Court’s sudden and
dramatic shift amounted to a de facto constitutional amendment.156
Regardless of which interpretation is correct, the New Deal Court marked a
significant departure from settled doctrinal principles and precedent.157
Scholars have long debated whether the Court in this era acted in accordance
with, or opposition to, the original meaning of the Commerce and Necessary
and Proper Clauses.158 The Rehnquist Court sought to curtail the New Deal
Court’s expansion of federal legislative power under the Commerce and
Necessary and Proper Clauses.
Prior to its monumental decision in NFIB, the Court interpreted the
Clause relatively narrowly regarding the amount of leeway afforded to
Congress in acting against the states.159 These cases involved issues ranging
from firearm regulation to gender-motivated violence to the power to legislate
under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.160 These decisions
expressly sought to limit congressional purview and protect states’ rights.161
But, the “federalism revolution” of the Rehnquist Court generally declined
to disturb the Court’s jurisprudence with respect to Congress’s power to
structure the federal government.162 This hesitance was not novel.
154

See Currie, supra note 151, at 541–42.
See generally BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF
A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL
(2000).
156
See generally 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998)
(Ackerman’s theory of “constitutional moments” is unique). For examples of scholars who argue that
Justice Owen Roberts’s “switch in time” of 1937 was a drastic change, see Laura Kalman,
The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1052 (2005);
LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996); and PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW
DEAL LAWYERS (1982).
157
See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 156; Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and
the New Deal, supra note 156; KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM, supra note 156;
IRONS, supra note 156.
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Compare JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) (arguing that the Framers understood
155

federal powers to reach any matter on which the states were incompetent to legislate), with Schmitt, supra
note 118 (arguing that the history of slavery and sectionalism necessarily dictates a narrow scope
of congressional power as a matter of original meaning, and any other reading is ahistorical).
159
See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
160
See id.; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In Boerne, the Court struck down the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act as applied to the states, holding that a remedy for a constitutional
violation must be “congruen[t] and proportional[]” to the alleged violation. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
161
See BALKIN, supra note 158, at 171.
162
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (declining to strike down the Ethics in Government
Act of 1978). Despite a vigorous dissent from Justice Scalia, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
independent counsel, deploying a multi-factor balancing test to determine that the independent counsel did
not interfere with the President’s executive power. See id.
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Indeed, despite the anticipated reining in of congressional power, the
Rehnquist Court generally remained deferential to Congress’s use of the
Necessary and Proper Clause to carry into execution “all other Powers vested
by [the] Constitution in the Government . . . .”163 In other words, the
Rehnquist Court largely adhered to what had become settled practice
regarding Congress’s power to structure the federal government.164
The Roberts Court has not been so deferential, as it has continued the
Rehnquist Court’s agenda of striking down laws as violative of general
federalism principles.165 But, it has also been more aggressive in policing
Congress in its capacity to structure the federal government.166 Under the
leadership of Chief Justice Roberts, the Court has utilized a “freestanding”
separation of powers principle to place limits on Congress in “horizontal”
separation of powers cases.167 This practice is peculiar, especially given the
increased presence of originalist justices on the Court. There is no explicit
“textual hook” on which to place such a freestanding principle.168 Instead, the
Justices have inferred a structural separation of powers principle from the
various provisions of the Constitution.169 This approach to “structural” issues
is diametrically opposed to the Court’s “textualist” approach to statutory
interpretation.170 For example, in Free Enterprise Fund, the majority
invalidated “dual” for-cause limitations on the President’s removal power,
holding such limitations “contravene the Constitution’s separation of
powers.”171 However, as John Manning has aptly illustrated, there is
no “separation of powers” clause in the Constitution.172 Instead, the Roberts
Court has cut this doctrine from whole cloth.173 This same principle clearly
applies to the Court’s removal jurisprudence, and the majority’s opinion in
Seila Law fails to recognize it.

163

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 156 (detailing the expansion of the executive branch during
the New Deal, and the Court’s acquiescence therewith).
165
See generally Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (striking down Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965). The Court relied on the principle of “equal state sovereignty” to strike down
Section 5, which spurred a flurry of scholarly criticism. See id. For a defense of that principle,
see Jeffrey M. Schmitt, In Defense of Shelby County’s Principle of Equal State Sovereignty, 68 OKLA. L.
REV. 209 (2016).
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See generally Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
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See generally Manning, supra note 31.
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Id. at 1992.
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See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1969) (wherein Professor Black eloquently articulates the method of structural inference).
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See John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation,
122 HARV. L. REV. 2003 (2009).
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The Necessary and Proper Clause and Congressional Power over
the State

We have seen how the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress
the vertical power to, among other things, regulate commerce among the
several states.174 But, the Necessary and Proper Clause also grants Congress
broad horizontal discretion to structure the federal government through
offices “establish[ed] by Law . . . .”175 As some scholars have argued,
the power to establish offices combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause
grants Congress plenary power to define the duties and powers of much of the
federal bureaucracy.176 Indeed, the First Congress created both the
Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Treasury, and
the statutes which created them differed in important ways.177 For example,
the secretaries in the Department of Foreign Affairs were explicitly
denominated “executive departments,” subject to the control and direction of
the President.178 Conversely, the Treasury Secretary was more insulated from
presidential control and did not expressly provide for presidential
oversight.179
For decades, the perceived orthodoxy was that the early American
state was one of “courts and parties.”180 The courts and parties were the
central organizing feature of the American state, and these two entities
together provided a workable, functioning government.181 For Skowronek
and others, the real advent of American administrative law was in the late
nineteenth century, and by 1920, “[t]he new American state emerged with
a powerful administrative arm . . . .”182 In the traditional interpretation, the
wake of the Civil War combined with increasing industrialization precipitated
the need for broader authority for the federal government.183 But, subsequent
scholars have proffered evidence to refute the claim that the early American
Republic was a state of dispersed—rather than centralized—power.184
Indeed, from the earliest days of the American Republic, Congress
regularly delegated broad rule-making authority to administrative officers and

174

See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
See West, supra note 2, at 171; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
176
See generally West, supra note 2; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND
THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL INSULATION IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
BUREAUCRACY, 1946–1997 (2003) (describing the growth of administrative capacities in the twentieth
century and how political insulation of bureaucrats affects policy outcomes).
177
GERHARD CASPER, SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD 42 (1997).
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180
STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920, at 24 (1982).
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Id. at 16.
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See id. at 16–17.
175

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol47/iss2/2

2022]

Seila Law and Removal Power

183

armed them with coercive enforcement mechanisms.185 In the first
congresses, legislators delegated broad authority to the executive branch to,
among other things, collect taxes and oversee monetary matters.186
In addition, the “direct tax” of 1798 involved significant delegations of rulemaking authority.187 The 1798 tax was the first use of a “direct” tax, meaning
that the tax was levied against property.188 The federal boards tasked with
collecting the tax were creatures of delegation, subject to a “just and
equitable” statutory standard.189 As Nick Parrillo notes, Hamilton and the
authors of The Federalist regarded the power to tax as quintessentially
legislative in nature.190 It is curious, then, that Congress saw fit to delegate
some of its power regarding taxation.191 If the Framers saw the delegation of
legislative power as a threat to the separation of powers, they presumably
would have been extraordinarily cautious about delegating the power to tax.
As Parrillo has shown, Congress was not so concerned. The evidence in favor
of delegation is relevant here because it shows Congress’s authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to design and specify the operation of
administrative agencies.
Congress also has the power to create those departments to which
legislative power was delegated.192 This is apparent from the text of the
Appointments Clause.193 Combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause,
the Appointments Clause grants Congress plenary power to legislate
departments into existence.194
But, as West explains, plenary
congressional power is not immediately apparent from the plain text of the
Constitution.195 Indeed, if the Article II Vesting Clause is, in fact, a residual
grant of powers, then congressional power over office creation must be at
least somewhat curtailed.196 But, as scholars have persuasively shown, the
Article II Vesting Clause was not a residuum of powers.197 Instead, the
Vesting Clause was merely the power to execute the laws enacted

185
JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED
YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4–5 (2012).
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Id. at 44–45.
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Parrillo, supra note 11, at 1302.
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See id. at 1302–03.
189
Id. at 1309.
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Id. at 1316; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 179-74 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar
Ass’n 2009).
191
Parrillo, supra note 11, at 1311.
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See generally West, supra note 2, at 177.
193
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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West, supra note 2, at 177.
195
Id. at 178.
196
Originalist scholars have long argued that the Vesting Clause is indeed a residuum of traditionally
executive powers, among those the power to create new offices. See, e.g., PRAKASH, supra note 88,
at 95–96.
197
Mortenson, supra note 16, at 1173.
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by Congress.198 The important takeaway, then, is that Congress’s plenary
power over office creation and agency design grants it the power to specify
removal limitations.199
Congress began to exercise its authority ever more assertively at the
turn of the twentieth century, as progressivism rose to prominence in the face
of a rapidly industrializing nation.200 Though there is reasonable debate
concerning the pervasiveness of centralized bureaucratic control prior to the
twentieth century, there is little debate that things changed after the century’s
turn. For example, the post office began as somewhat localized.201 Indeed,
the post office was highly influential, as it was responsible for mass
communication of information.202 The post office was not alone, however,
as local governments enjoyed broad authority under the police power to
regulate for the public welfare.203 But, as the twentieth century wore on,
regulation became less of a local matter and more of a federal, centralized
one.204 At the center of this movement was Congress, utilizing its plenary
authority to create offices. This history is therefore instructive, as
it establishes a long line of congressional practice in constructing the federal
government.
III.

SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE AND REMOVAL POWER

Removal power has been a topic of contentious debate at the Supreme
Court. Unfortunately, the Court’s jurisprudence has been anything but
uniform, spawning exceptions and now, exceptions to exceptions. This Part
will discuss key Supreme Court cases that address the removal question.
The Author’s aim is not to be exhaustive but rather to provide context for the
current moment in the Court’s jurisprudence regarding presidential power
generally and removal power more specifically.
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Id.
West argues that the Constitution disaggregates office creation from the power to appoint and
remove officers, arguing that the power to create offices is vested solely to Congress, whereas the power
to appoint and remove officers is vested in the President. West, supra note 2, at 172–73. West, therefore,
argues that for-cause removal limitations are unconstitutional. Id. at 173.
200
See Stephen Skowronek & Stephen M. Engel, Introduction: The Progressives’ Century, in
THE PROGRESSIVES’ CENTURY: POLITICAL REFORM, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE MODERN
AMERICAN STATE 3 (Stephen Skowronek et al. eds., 2016).
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See Daniel P Carpenter, From Patronage to Policy: The Centralization Campaign and the Iowa
Post Offices, 1880–1915, 58 ANNALS IOWA 273, 274 (1999); see generally DANIEL P. CARPENTER,
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EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928 (2001).
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the general welfare).
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A. Myers v. United States
The Court’s first encounter with removal manifested itself in the
Myers case. In that case, Chief Justice William Howard Taft—a former
President himself—held that the removal power was a part of the “executive
power” of the Article II Vesting Clause.205 Chief Justice Taft embarked
on an extensive exploration of the “Decision of 1789,” which refers to the
First Congress’s debate concerning the removal power.206 In 1917, Frank
Myers was appointed first-class postmaster of Portland, Oregon, by President
Woodrow Wilson.207 Myers’s tenure was to last four years, but he was
subsequently removed by President Wilson in 1920.208
Following his removal by President Wilson, Myers filed suit in the
Court of Claims to recover his remaining salary.209 The Court of Claims ruled
against Myers, holding that he did not timely file suit, and his claim was
therefore barred.210 Myers died prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, but his
widow and executor continued the litigation on behalf of his estate.211
At issue was the constitutionality of an 1876 statute, which mandated
“Postmasters of the first, second, and third classes shall be appointed and may
be removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
. . .”212 The Senate had not consented to the removal of Myers.213 Therefore,
the constitutional question could be stated as such: does the President, by way
of Article II, wield the sole power to remove officers of the United States?
If the answer to this question were “yes,” the statute would be
unconstitutional, and Myers’s estate would be barred from recovery.214
The lower court had attempted to avoid the constitutional question presented,
but the Supreme Court knew that it could not avoid providing an answer.215
Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority, answered the question
in the affirmative.216 “The vesting of the executive power in the President
was essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws.”217 Taft further
reasoned that the President alone could not possibly oversee the operations
205

Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926).
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of the Executive Branch, and so he must be able to supervise his subordinates
through the power of removal.218 Taft also drew upon the Take Care Clause,
which mandates that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed . . . .”219 In other words, the President—through his power to remove
officers at will—may control the execution of the laws enacted
by Congress.220 The Court’s decision in Myers represented an embrace of
what scholars would now call the “unitary executive.”221 The decision
represents a formalistic approach to separation of powers disputes: any
executive branch officer must be removable by the President as an “incident
of the power to appoint them . . . .”222 With the advent of the New Deal,
the Court’s formalistic approach would change soon thereafter, when the
Court added an additional wrinkle to its separation of powers analysis.
B. Humphrey’s Executor v. United States
The Court’s decision in Humphrey’s Executor represented
a movement away from Myers’ relatively formalistic reasoning of Article II.
As discussed above, Myers sought to provide a straightforward answer to
a complex question: does the President, by way of Article II, possess the
prerogative to remove officers of the United States?223 Chief Justice Taft
answered in the affirmative.224
However, by the 1930s, the
federal government continued to expand under the leadership of
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his efforts to reorganize the Executive
Branch.225 Roosevelt’s expansion of the presidency raised fundamental
questions about the President’s power under Article II. 226 Such a question
presented itself in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.227
In 1931, William Humphrey was nominated to serve on the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) by President Herbert Hoover.228
Humphrey’s commission under Hoover was to last for a term of seven years,
but Franklin Roosevelt defeated Hoover in the election of 1932.229
Thereafter, President Roosevelt asked for Humphrey’s resignation from his
position on the FTC, to which Humphrey declined, and Roosevelt then
218
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The Antifascist Roots of Presidential Administration, 122 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2022).
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addressed a letter summarily removing him from office.230 Section One of
the Federal Trade Commission Act—the statute establishing the
commission—held that a commissioner was removable by the President for
“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” or “for cause.”231
The statute thus presented two questions: (1) did the statute limit the
President’s power of removal, and (2) if so, was such a limitation
constitutional?
In an opinion by Justice Sutherland, the Court answered both
questions in the affirmative.232 Regarding the first question, the Court
considered the perceived need for independence in making judgments
requiring expertise on certain subjects.233 The statute purported to create
a board of experts intended to be “independent of executive authority, except
in its selection, and free to exercise its judgment without the leave or
hindrance” of any other government official.234
Moving to the second question, the Court distinguished the
postmaster at issue in Myers from the FTC Commissioner at issue in the
present case.235 The postmaster exercised purely executive power and was
thus essentially a unit of the executive branch such that the President must
have independent control over him.236 Alternatively, the members of the FTC
were tasked with exercising “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” power.237
This was the constitutional line in the sand drawn by the Court.
C. Morrison v. Olson
Humphrey’s Executor represented a movement away from formalism
toward functionalism in separation of powers disputes, and the Court’s
decision in Morrison solidified that movement in the legal doctrine, though
not without disagreement.238 The Court’s decision in Morrison is the epitome
of the current debate on the removal power and its proper situation in the
Constitution’s system of separated powers.239
The dispute in Morrison arose under the Ethics in Government Act
of 1978.240 That statute was enacted in the wake of the Watergate Scandal to
230
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promote lawful behavior in the government, and it provided certain
mechanisms to enforce its goals; one such provision was the establishment of
the independent counsel.241 Under the statute, the independent counsel could
only be appointed by a panel of federal judges upon request by the Attorney
General, and once appointed, only the Attorney General could remove
the independent counsel for cause.242
In 1982, Theodore Olson was Assistant Attorney General for the
Office of Legal Counsel and refused to turn over certain documents
subpoenaed by a subcommittee of the House of Representatives.243
That refusal came pursuant to President Ronald Reagan’s order to assert
executive privilege over the documents.244 Following that refusal, Olson and
several high-level officials testified before Congress; and several documents
were uncovered that led the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee to submit
a request for the appointment of an independent counsel to the Attorney
General, which was granted.245
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the statute was
unconstitutional because the independent counsel performed core executive
tasks and was appointed by a court of law rather than the President.246
The Court of Appeals also held that the removal restrictions placed on the
Attorney General by the statute violated the separation of powers, and the
independent counsel itself interfered with the Executive Branch’s
mandate under the Take Care Clause.247 In a 7–to–1 opinion written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court and
upheld the constitutionality of the independent counsel.248
In upholding the statute, the Court employed a multi-factor test and
continued the functionalist approach of Humphrey’s Executor.249
The majority held that the independent counsel was an inferior officer “to
some degree” because she could be removed by the Attorney General,
an officer removable at will by the President.250 Next, the Court pointed to
the independent counsel’s limited duties; she could investigate and perhaps
241
Andrew B. Pardue, Note, “When the President Does It”: Why Congress Should Take the Lead in
Investigations of Executive Wrongdoing, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 573, 578–79 (2019). For more
discussion on the Watergate scandal, see generally CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE
PRESIDENT’S MEN: THE GREATEST REPORTING STORY OF ALL TIME (1974).
242
ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 592(c)(1), 92 Stat.1868, § 596(a)(1),
92 Stat. 1872.
243
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 665.
244
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245
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246
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principal officers, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate; the Clause also dictates that Congress
may vest appointments of certain “inferior” officers “in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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prosecute crimes but possessed no policy-making or administrative role
within the Executive Branch.251 Finally, the independent counsel was limited
in tenure and jurisdiction, meaning she could only serve in that capacity until
her task was complete and could only investigate those matters prescribed by
the appointing documents.252
IV. ANALYSIS: SEILA LAW AND THE FUTURE OF REMOVAL POWER
This section will first discuss the tension exemplified by the majority
and dissenting opinions in the Supreme Court’s decision in Seila Law.
Next, it will discuss why the legal positions espoused by Unitary Executive
theorists make no sense as a matter of constitutional structure. This section
will also discern when (and if) the Court will further its embrace of the
Unitary Executive in future cases. Finally, this section will argue that the
Court should not extend its holding in Seila Law to future cases and draw on
doctrine and history as support for that proposition.
A. Seila Law and the Embrace of the Unitary Executive
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, Congress enacted
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank” or “the Act”).253 The Act established the CFPB, a federal
agency to oversee various aspects of the financial and consumer markets, such
as banks, lenders, credit unions, and debt collectors.254 The CFPB was to be
headed by a single director.255 Perhaps predictably, the CFPB was to be met
with constitutional challenges.256
The first such challenge came in PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau before the United States Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit.257 There, the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of
the CFPB, but then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissent in which he
criticized the Agency (and by implication, the entire administrative state) as
violative of the separation of powers.258 The CFPB was safe, but
Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent garnered support from conservative and
originalist legal academics who had been making the same general point for
decades.259
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
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Enter Seila Law. The case arose in 2017 when the CFPB issued
a “civil investigative demand” on Seila Law, a California-based law firm, on
the belief that the firm had engaged in unlawful practices with regard to
debt-related matters.260 Rather than complying with the civil investigative
demand—which is essentially a subpoena—the firm refused compliance on
the grounds that the CFPB’s lone director violated the separation of powers.261
The District Court and the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the firm’s contention
and ordered compliance; the Supreme Court thus granted the petition for writ
of certiorari to resolve the constitutional issue.262
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts struck down the
directorship of the CFPB.263
In this decision, the Chief Justice
encompassed—in a single sentence—the view of Unitary Executive theorists:
“Under our Constitution, the ‘executive Power’—all of it—is ‘vested in
a President,’ who must ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”264
That sentence encompasses the central flaw in the unitarian view; the
Vesting Clause does not include “all of it.” The majority thus embraced the
central theme of Myers that the President is generally vested with the
unfettered power to remove executive branch officers at will.265
The majority’s view can fairly be characterized as formalistic in that it is
a supposedly concrete rule to be applied to the separation of powers
disputes.266 Unfortunately, the majority ignores the role of Congress while
simultaneously making assumptions about the structure of the government.
B. Congress’s Role in Shaping the Executive Branch
The Seila Law majority takes the liberty of inserting the words “all of
it” into the Vesting Clause of Article II.267 The assumption that the majority
makes is not new; Justice Scalia famously enunciated the same principle.268
However, the flaw in relying on such simplified logic simultaneously rewrites
Article II while ignoring the deference shown by the Court in Congress’s
construction of the federal government.
The fundamental tension in Seila Law is between competing textual
provisions discussed above: The Necessary and Proper Clause and the
Vesting Clause of Article II.269 If “the executive Power” vested in
260
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the President by Article II includes the power to remove officers, it seems that
the Necessary and Proper Clause is rendered a dead letter, at least insofar as it
allows Congress to structure the federal government.
As discussed above, the Court has, in recent decades, been much
more aggressive in striking down laws on federalism grounds rather than in
horizontal separation of powers disputes.270 Conversely, the Court’s removal
jurisprudence has been deferential to Congress’s use of the Necessary and
Proper Clause to specify, via statute, the composition of administrative
agencies.271 This Court’s federalism jurisprudence thus exemplifies a narrow
reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The Court’s relatively narrow interpretation of the Necessary and
Proper Clause in federalism disputes does not preclude broad congressional
power over administrative agencies.
As discussed above, those
interpretations are somewhat opposed. Why would the Court—in decisions
such as Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison—give deference to the Clause in
separation of powers disputes, but not federalism disputes as in
United States v. Lopez and NFIB?272 The answer lies in the specificity of facts
and the ways in which that specificity is ignored by Unitary Executive
theorists. Discussion of upcoming cases is illustrative of these flaws.
C. Collins v. Yellen
During its October term of 2020, the Supreme Court heard arguments
in Collins v. Yellen (“Collins”), a challenge to the constitutionality of the
Fair Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”).273 That case raises a constitutional
challenge to the Director of the FHFA, whose statutory structure is virtually
identical to that of the CFPB directorship struck down by the Court in Seila
Law.274 On June 23, 2021, the Court handed down its decision, striking down
the structure of the FHFA Director as violative of the separation of powers.275
The Court’s failure to acknowledge distinguishing factors between the FHFA
from the CFPB effectively disregards certain fundamental features of the two
agencies. As this section will show, the adoption of the Unitary Executive by
the Court risks the failure to take important differences into account.
The Court granted certiorari in Collins so that it could determine
whether the differences between the directors of the CFPB and FHFA were
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constitutionally significant.276 Writing for the majority, Justice Alito held that
the structure of the FHFA was so similar to the CFPB that the decision in
Seila Law dictated the result in Collins.277 The Court declined to consider the
differences between the FHFA and the CFPB, even though, inter alia, the
FHFA is responsible for enforcing one federal statute compared to the
CFPB’s nineteen.278
In his brief as court-appointed amicus curiae, Aaron Nielson pointed
out the necessary distinction between the FHFA acting and appointed
directors.279 Similar to the language at issue in Seila Law, the Director of the
FHFA serves for a term of five years “unless removed before the end of such
term for cause by the President.”280 Thus, the chief argument in distinguishing
the two directors was that the acting Director of the FHFA is removable
at will.281 The text of the statute establishing the removal permissions
applicable to the confirmed FHFA Director and the acting director are
separate.282 The inclusion of removal permissions for the confirmed director,
but not the acting director is convincing evidence that the acting director is
removable at will by the President.283 In other words, the Director of the
CFPB exercised significant executive power, unaccountable to the President,
whereas the acting Director of the FHFA is accountable to the President via
removal. Despite the importance of the “significant executive power” inquiry
to the Seila Law decision, the majority in Collins surreptitiously abandoned
it.284 Instead, the majority declared that “the nature and breadth of
an agency’s authority is not dispositive” when determining the acceptability
of a removal permission.285 This argument is convincing and correct in the
Author’s view. However, the analysis could rest on separate grounds
regarding Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to take note of the
complexities inherent in separation of powers disputes. The power to carry
into execution the powers vested in departments and officers of the
United States government gives Congress sole legislative power over those
officials.286 The Unitary Executive Theory is attractive as it purports to confer
an easily administrable rule. But, as Professor Nielson pointed out, the FHFA
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does not wield “significant executive power” as defined in Seila Law.287
Though the Court’s decision in Seila Law fails to comport with precedent,
there is certainly a distinguishing factor between the single Director of the
CFPB and the acting Director of the FHFA. The CFPB Director was vested
with the authority to nineteen federal statutes.288 Additionally, the FHFA does
not act directly on individual persons.289 Whereas the CFPB has broad power
to impose penalties, the FHFA is only able to issue subpoenas if certain
statutory reporting requirements are not being met.290
The foregoing evidence establishes the problem with adopting overly
formalistic rules such as the Unitary Executive Theory. As prominent
scholars have argued, the Necessary and Proper Clause does “not grant
Congress the power to strip the President of his constitutional authority and
obligation to supervise and control the executive branch.”291 But, this
argument misses the very essence of Congress’s role. Congress possesses the
necessary resources to make certain judgments and distinguish certain
agencies’ statutory authority. The idea of a federal court stepping in and
interfering with the considered judgments of Congress is repugnant
to democratic values. The courts should therefore be more deferential to
Congress’s judgments henceforth.
D. The Supreme Court and the Future of Removal
The Court’s decision in Seila Law was somewhat predictable.
Its recent precedent indicated a movement towards broader presidential
control over the bureaucracy, with Morrison and Humphrey’s Executor
quietly fading into the jurisprudential background.292 The removal limitations
in Free Enterprise Fund were somewhat unique and potentially odious for
separation of powers purposes. Seila Law represented a significant step
forward and further relegated Morrison and Humphrey’s Executor to
exceptions, confined to their facts. Indeed, the Author believes that Morrison
and Humphrey’s Executor are essentially dead letters, overruled by narrowing
decisions by the Supreme Court.293
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The Court will continue to encounter opportunities to further its
embrace of the Unitary Executive. On June 21, 2021, the Court decided
United States v. Arthrex, which presented an Appointments Clause challenge
to federal administrative patent judges.294 Though the constitutional
provision at issue was the Appointments Clause, Supreme Court precedent
mandates that removal power is a significant factor in determining which
officers are “principal” or “inferior.”295 Additionally, lower courts are hearing
and deciding similar cases.296 Outside of the courts, the Executive Branch has
continued to take advantage of the theory in the wake of the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Seila Law and Collins.297 The Office of Legal Counsel opinion,
issued on July 8, 2021, embraces the legal positions taken in Seila Law and
Collins, offering further legitimacy to the theory.298 The influence
and pervasive importance of removal power are thus quite profound.
Following oral argument, there was some belief that the Court would
not reach the constitutionality of the removal limitation in Collins.299 But, as
the decision makes apparent, that notion is cold comfort. The Court will not
always have access to (or willingness to) take the jurisdictional “off-ramp”
in the important separation of powers cases, and it does not appear that the
Court is willing to do so even when available. Further, the Court’s removal
power jurisprudence is inconsistent and often contradictory.300 As the
jurisprudence sits now, Congress may use the Necessary and Proper Clause
to insulate executive branch officers only with respect to multi-member
commissions, as in Humphrey’s Executor, or officers who do not interfere
with the President’s executive power too much.301 In short, the doctrine is
one riddled with exceptions and leaves Congress (and the People) in the dark
as to whether certain agencies are consistent with the Constitution. This is
no way to adjudicate the separation of powers so integral to the American
Republic.
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CONCLUSION

The removal debate has raged since the First Congress.302 What is
more, the debate has no intention of resolving itself.303 Yet, this Comment
has sought to provide a prospective diagnosis of the issue moving forward.
The Supreme Court will doubtlessly continue to hear disputes that present
challenges to the Administrative State and its statutory structures.304 This
Comment shows that the history surrounding the removal debate is complex
and labyrinthine in nature.305 Given the complexity of the history, it is
unacceptable for the Supreme Court—in purporting to take history
seriously—to adopt such a simplistic approach to its separation of powers
jurisprudence. As such, the Court’s recent decision in Seila Law represents
a disturbing and ahistorical assault on public administration as it has existed
for decades. Today, institutional authority is not merely political and legal
but knowledge-based.306 Acknowledging this fact requires a separation of
powers jurisprudence that accommodates—rather than dismisses—
knowledge-based institutional dialogue. The Supreme Court and adherents
to the Unitary Executive theory ought to take notice.
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